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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
This chapter examines the ability of the South African Constitutional Court to apply 
economic and social rights (ESR) and whether the constitutionalisation of ESR represents a 
mechanism capable of entrenching a substantive or ‘thick’1 conception of the rule of law. 
After apartheid, South Africa adopted an impressive Constitution which considers 
international law and justiciable human rights as pillars of the new democracy. The 
negotiators of the new constitutional framework acknowledged that the decades of economic 
and social exclusion of a large proportion of South Africa’s population had to end if the rule 
of law was to be established in a meaningful way.2 A mere retraction of discriminatory laws 
and an adherence to a formal (‘thin’)3 notion of the rule of law was viewed as insufficient to 
break with the abusive past of the apartheid era. Instead, the drafters adopted a ‘thick’ account 
                                                 
* The author thanks the editors of this volume as well as the members of the COST working group on 
International Law in Domestic Courts for their helpful comments.  
 
1 A ‘thick’ or substantive conception of the rule of law is one which not only deals with formalist attributes of a 
legal framework, but also with substantive notions of justice, such as equality or dignity. In the Dworkinian 
conception, proponents of a 'thick' understanding of the rule of law emphasise that the formal legal rules should 
capture and enforce substantive rights. See J Stromseth, R Brooks and D Wippman, Can Might Make Rights? 
Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006) ch 3. 
2 A Sachs, Advancing Human Rights in South Africa (Oxford University Press, Cape Town 1992) xii. 
3 A ‘thin’ or minimal conception of the rule of law is one which emphasises the rule of law’s formal and 
structural components, such as rules, legal processes and procedures regularly followed. In the Aristotelian view, 
a ‘government of laws, not men’ protects people against anarchy and allows the predictability of legal 
consequences. See Stromseth, Brooks and Wippman (n 1) ch 3. 
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of the rule of law. The aspiration of this substantive conception of the rule of law is 
characterised by the commitment to the values enshrined in South Africa’s Bill of Rights, 
including justiciable economic and social rights.4 The preamble of the 1996 South African 
Constitution states that the country modified its constitutional framework in order to ‘[h]eal 
the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights.’5  
 
The present volume studies the effects of empowering domestic courts to apply international 
legal principles after countries emerge from conflict or oppressive rule. South Africa is an 
example of an attempt to empower domestic courts to consider international law. Perhaps 
even more importantly, South Africa is an example of a domestification of the international 
rule of law: whereas the previous constitutions of 1910, 1961 and 1983 had no bill of rights, 
the drafters of the current, 1996 Constitution made a deliberate effort to harmonise the new 
Bill of Rights with international law. The reliance on international human rights norms was 
not confined to civil and political rights, but the 1996 Constitution includes a wide range of 
justiciable socio-economic rights and adopts language from the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and from General Comments of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Committee). 
 
This chapter examines the success of the constitutional entrenchment of ESR in South 
Africa’s legal system. The chapter considers ‘transformative constitutionalism’6 and its ability 
to fulfil the ambitions, expressed in the new constitutional preamble, of setting out to establish 
a society based on social justice and fundamental human rights. The South African 
jurisprudence after the constitutionalisation of human rights, in particular ESR, has been 
praised by the international community. Nevertheless, the central tenets of the chapter are two 
cautionary findings. First, the analysis cautions against using constitutional change alone to 
enhance the rule of law after conflict or oppressive rule. Although constitutional adjudication 
in South Africa has had positive outcomes, modifying the place accorded to international law 
                                                 
4 On the varieties of substantive conceptions of the rule of law see ibid ch 3. 
5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 preamble 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/index.htm. 
6 S Liebenberg, 'South Africa: Adjudicating Socio-Economic Rights under a Transformative Constitution' in M 
Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) 75 According to Liebenberg, a transformative constitution is one which is to 
‘facilitate a fundamental change in the legacy of injustice produced over three centuries of colonial and apartheid 
rule.’ The term goes back to K Klare, 'Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism' 14 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 146. The Constitutional Court emphasised that the new Constitution was to effect 
social change. S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para 261f. Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) para 74. 
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in the domestic legal system is largely insufficient for the realisation of ESR and the ‘thick’ 
conception of the rule of law envisioned by the drafters of the 1996 Constitution. Second, the 
chapter finds that a domestic belief in the relevance of international and national legal norms 
was decisive in the South African experience. The constitutional empowerment of domestic 
courts to apply international legal principles would not, by itself, explain the practice of 
national courts insisting on the implementation of rights recognised in international law. 
Moreover, a number of unique factors related to the actors and process leading to the 
constitutional transformation in South Africa contribute to explain the remarkable transition 
towards an international law friendly constitution. While the empowerment of domestic courts 
in South Africa provides lessons for other states, those lessons are primarily ones regarding 
limitations, complexities and context-specific issues that arise in the empowerment of 
domestic courts to apply international legal principles in situations of transition.  
Section 2 describes the role of international law in the domestic legal system before 
and after the end of the apartheid. Section 3 presents the most important constitutional cases 
that have arisen from the ESR provisions in the 1996 Constitution. It assesses the ability of 
courts to deal with socio-economic rights according to two alternative criteria: the degree of 
formal entrenchment of international norms and concrete improvements in the realisation of 
the socio-economic rights litigated before the Constitutional Court. Section 4 endeavours to 
identify some lessons as to what can reasonably be expected from modifications of the 
prominence given to international law and the role of domestic courts when it comes to the 
vindication of economic and social human rights. Section 5 offers conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
2. SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DURING AND AFTER 
APARTHEID 
 
 
The emphasis on international law and human rights in domestic proceedings in South Africa 
was minimal before the end of the apartheid. This section delineates historical changes 
following South Africa’s transition from apartheid.  
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2.1. The ‘Thin’ Rule of Law During Apartheid 
 
The apartheid regime was built on widespread violations of social, economic, civil and 
political rights.7 Since the accession of the National Party (NP) to power in 1948, rights to 
freedom of movement, employment, electoral, education, and many others were severely 
restricted. Forced evictions were carried out on a massive scale.8 In the absence of an 
instrument delineating constitutional human rights, the courts could not discuss or determine 
issues regarding potential violations of human rights by the Parliament.9 The conception of 
judicial review was very narrow and courts were deferential to the (unrepresentative) 
legislative branch.10 No law enacted by Parliament could be invalidated by the courts, except 
in relation to the ‘entrenched clauses’ which protected the equality of English and Afrikaans 
as the two official languages.11 Judges gave effect to discriminatory and unjust laws and 
generally refused to interfere with administrative orders.12 Was South Africa therefore lacking 
the rule of law? The answer of course depends on one’s notion of the rule of law. While the 
apartheid regime was considered woefully illegitimate by the domestic majority and the 
international community,13 apartheid was framed within a minimalist, formal rule of law 
regime.  
South Africa’s experience differs from the situation of many other transitioning 
countries because its courts continued to function throughout apartheid. Oppressive practices 
were implemented according to laws promulgated by Parliament pursuant to formal legal 
rules. If one would define the rule of law as mere obedience to laws adopted through formal 
procedures – irrespective of the substance of those laws – then apartheid was a regime 
implemented according to a minimal (‘thin’) rule of law. But not even Steven Kautz, adherent 
of a ‘thin’ notion of the rule of law, would qualify the apartheid regime as one of the rule of 
                                                 
7 M Pieterse, 'Possibilities and Pitfalls in the Domestic Enforcement of Social Rights: Contemplating the South 
African Experience' (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 882, 883. International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and 
G Bindman, South Africa: Human Rights and the Rule of Law (Pinter, London 1988). 
8 ICJ and Bindman (n 7)  9. 
9 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 110 of 1983, s 34(3) (n 5). 
10 D Penna, 'Apartheid, the Law and Reform in South Africa' 37 (2) Africa Today 5, 7. South Africa has a mixed 
legal system based on Roman-Dutch substantive law and English procedural law. For an introduction, see R 
Zimmermann and D Visser, Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1996). 
11 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 110 of 1983, s 34(3) (n 5).  
12 D Ipp, 'Ethical Problems with Judicial Activism: Edited Version of a Paper Given at a Conference in Beijing 
Organised by the National Judicial College', Beijing, 12 October 2004 
www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_ipp12_191004 n 30. See also the final 
report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, analysing the role of the legal profession during apartheid: 
South Africa TRC, Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Cape Town, The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 2002), Vol. 4. 
13 See for instance UNGA Res 2202 (1966) GAOR 21st Session (16 December 1966) determining that apartheid 
constituted a crime against humanity. 
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law. According to Kautz, it is only ‘reasonable obedience to laws that respect the natural 
equality of human beings’ which constitutes the rule of law.14  
 
After closed door negotiations had been underway for some time, the 1990 release from 
prison of Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) started the process 
towards a thicker notion of the rule of law. Not without violence,15 a long and well-
documented bargaining process between the protagonists of the main parties ensued.16 A 
record of understanding, signed in 1992, formed the essential core of the broader and detailed 
agreement finalised in June 1993 – the ‘Interim Constitution’. The Interim Constitution 
contained 34 principles and provided for a Constitutional Court to have wide jurisdiction. The 
Interim Constitution also entrusted to the new Court to ‘certify’ the final constitution to 
ensure that it complied with the agreed 34 principles. In 1996, the new, amended Constitution 
was adopted. 
 
 
2.2. International Law in the New Constitution  
 
In the early 1990s, the attitude in South Africa towards international law shifted profoundly. 
During apartheid, South Africa had not been a party to any UN or regional human rights 
conventions. Dugard notes how South Africa had become ‘a pariah state within the 
international community; a delinquent state in the context of the “new” international law of 
human rights. Domestically, international law fared little better.’17 The lengthy process of 
formalizing a new constitution was used as an opportunity to establish anew what its drafters 
considered the most appropriate relationships between the different branches and levels of 
government, as well as between domestic law and international law. The two major political 
forces participating in the negotiations, the governing NP and the ANC, both appeared to 
                                                 
14 Kautz defines the rule of law as reasonable obedience to laws ‘to remedy our natural human condition of 
insecurity’. Law has to be followed, ‘for its own sake and not as a means to justice.’ S Kautz, 'Liberty, Justice, 
and the Rule of Law' 11 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 435, 438, 468 (emphasis in original). 
15 It is estimated that more than 14000 people lost their lives in political violence. P Du Toit, South Africa’s 
Brittle Peace (Palgrave, 2001) 31.  
16 See in particular M Newitt and M Bennun, Negotiating Justice: A New Constitution for South Africa 
(University of Exeter Press, 1995); R Spitz and M Chaskalson, The Politics of Transition: A Hidden History of 
South Africa's Negotiated Settlement (Hart Publishing, 2000); B De Villiers, Birth of a Constitution (Juta, 
Kenwyn 1994); S Friedman and D Atkinson, 'The Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement' 7 South 
African Review; H Cobban, 'Mozambique, Rwanda and South Africa Assessed' in W Schabas, R Thakur and E 
Hughes (eds), Atrocities and International Accountability: Beyond Transitional Justice (UN University Press, 
Tokyo 2007) 42.  
17 J Dugard, 'International Law and the South African Constitution' (1997) 8 European Journal of International 
Law 77, 77.  
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agree that human rights law was a necessary element of the new order. In the fall of 1992, the 
NP and the ANC established that the new constitution to be drafted ‘shall incorporate 
guaranteed justiciable fundamental rights and freedoms.’18 The 1993 Interim Constitution 
included a first bill of rights and provisions on the place of international law in the domestic 
legal system. The Interim Constitution was therefore conceived as ‘a historic bridge between 
the past of a deeply divided society and a future founded on the recognition of human rights 
and opportunities for all South Africans’.19  
 
The 1996 Constitution consolidated the interest in human rights and international law. There 
are four reasons for describing the 1996 Constitution as an instrument friendly to international 
law.20 First, self-executing international treaty provisions can be directly implemented without 
prior legislative action.21 Second, the Constitution provides that international law is a guide to 
judicial interpretation and must be considered by the adjudicators and law of other national 
jurisdictions may be considered.22 Third, courts are required to give priority to any 
interpretation consistent with international law.23 Finally, ‘when interpreting any legislation, 
and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’24 This clause illustrates the 
conception of a ‘thicker’ notion of the rule of law and the willingness to empower courts to 
transform society in a way that would ‘establish a society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights.’25 In addition, section 232 constitutionalises the rule 
that customary international law is part of South African law unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament. By entrenching international norms in the legal system, 
the drafters of the new Bill of Rights deliberately sought to harmonise the Constitution with 
international law. Furthermore, they facilitated South Africa’s accession to human rights 
treaties and promoted reintegration of South Africa in the ‘family of nations’.26 
                                                 
18 Record of Understanding, Concluded at a Meeting Between the State President of the Republic of South 
Africa and the President of the African National Congress Held at the World Trade Centre on the 26 September 
1992 http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?include=docs/misc/1992/recordk.html.  
19 (Interim) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 ‘postamble’ 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/93cons.htm. 
20 C Heyns and F Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level 
(Kluwer, The Hague 2002) 542. 
21 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 s 231(4) (n 5). 
22 ibid s 39(1)b. 
23 ibid s 233. 
24 ibid s 39(2). 
25 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 preamble (n 5).  
26 ibid. 
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While the human rights provisions of the Interim Constitution were largely confined to 
civil and political rights,27 the 1996 Bill of Rights extends protection to ESR. All six UN 
human rights conventions existing at that time were relied upon in the drafting process.28 
Interestingly, the ICESCR served as a normative guide despite South Africa’s failure to ratify 
it.29 According to Dugard, the importance given to international human rights norms is 
evident in the first case heard by the new Court: In 1995, in a decision on the death penalty, 
the Constitutional Court dispelled fears that the term ‘international law’ might be narrowly 
construed to cover only undisputed customary international law and conventions ratified by 
South Africa. Courts are obliged to consider public international law when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights,30 and the Court insisted that this provision must be read to refer to international 
law broadly, including to international treaties not ratified by the Republic and soft law such 
as declarations or resolutions by the UN General Assembly.31 
 
 
2.3. The Bill of Rights and Reasons for a ‘Thick’ Conception of Rule of Law 
 
During the negotiations of the 1996 Constitution, the widely perceived need to break with the 
past caused many to argue for a comprehensive Bill of Rights. This position was in the end 
adopted and it led to the eventual constitutionalisation of ESR.32 For the negotiators, a 
retraction of explicitly discriminatory laws was insufficient to building a legitimate and 
substantive rule of law and to consolidate a new and more equitable order.  
 
 
2.3.1. Justiciable Economic and Social Rights  
The core provisions regarding socio-economic rights are contained in sections 26, 27, 
28(1)(c), 29 and 35(2)(e) of the 1996 Constitution.33 Sections 26(1) and 27(1) contain the 
right of everyone to have access to adequate housing; health care services, sufficient food and 
                                                 
27 Heyns and Viljoen (n 20) 553. The main exception is the right to education which was already contained in the 
Interim Constitution. 
28 ibid 552. 
29 See Re Certification of the Constitution (n 51) n 46. Paradoxically, South Africa signed the treaty on 3 October 
1994, but, after repeated promises, it has yet to ratify the treaty. 
30 (Interim) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 s 35(1) and Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Act 110 of 1983, s 39(1)b (n 19). 
31 S v Makwanyane (n 6) para 35. The case concerned the death penalty, the ICCPR and foreign law were 
extensively used by the Court. 
32 T Maluwa, 'International Human Rights Norms and the South African Interim Constitution 1993' (1994) 19 
South African Yearbook of International Law 14. 
33 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (n 5). 
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water; and social security. The state must, under sections 26(2) and 27(2) ‘take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights’. With minor differences, these subsections mirror article 
2(1) of the ICESCR.34 The drafters of the 1996 Constitution adopted the wording of that 
article and section 7 of the Constitution also embraced the tripartite typology of 
interdependent duties. Theoretically developed first by Shue35 and later, by the jurisprudence 
of the supervisory Committee,36 the state has three-dimensional obligations to respect, protect 
and fulfil human rights. Sections 26 and 27 have attracted the most attention from 
commentators because it was on the basis of them that the Constitutional Court developed its 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence.37  
The Constitution gives South African courts the power to interpret socio-economic 
rights, to resolve disputes by relying on the principles of socio-economic rights and to make a 
just and equitable order, including the ability to award ‘appropriate relief’.38 Brand describes 
South African courts’ impressive array of remedial powers: they can enforce constitutional 
socio-economic rights directly by hearing constitutional challenges to any legislation;39 by 
hearing challenges that state or private conduct is inconsistent with socio-economic rights;40 
or by accepting an argument by the litigant that the law is inconsistent with the ‘objective 
value system’ underlying the particular provisions of the Bill of Rights.41 At levels below the 
Constitutional Court, judges can also enforce socio-economic rights. The ability of lower 
courts to adjudicate these matters is significant since these courts are more accessible and 
often less constrained in their ability to enforce rights, particularly if legislative, executive or 
administrative action has already defined them. South Africa’s law on standing is broad, such 
                                                 
34 There are two subtle differences between the wording of the second sub-s of s 26 and 27 in the South African 
Constitution and art 2(1) of the ICESCR: First, the South African provision uses ‘reasonable measures’ instead 
of ‘appropriate’, and the ICESCR speaks of the ‘maximum of available resources’ while s 26 and 27 use the 
standard ‘within available resources’. 
35 H Shue, 'Rights in the Light of Duties' in P Brown and D MacLean (eds), Human Rights and US Foreign 
Policy (Lexington, Lexington Books 1979). 
36 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 'General Comment No 12 on the Right to Adequate 
Food' (12 May 1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 para 15; and UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 'General Comment No 14 on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health' (11 August 2000) 
UN Doc E/CN.12/2000/4 para 33. 
37 See S Liebenberg, 'Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under Bills of Rights: The South African 
Experience' 16 Human Rights Defender 2. 
38 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 s 38 (n 5). 
39 See D Brand, 'Socio-Economic Rights and Courts in South Africa: Justiciability on a Sliding Scale' in F 
Coomans (ed), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights: Experiences from Domestic Systems (Maastricht 
Series in Human Rights, 5. Intersentia, Antwerpen 2006) 207. 
40 The Court could overturn such conduct and draft a constitutional remedy.  
41 If the court would accept this argument, it could interpret the statutory provision in question, or develop the 
common law rule so as to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
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that persons can also enforce statutory commitments against the state on behalf of a group of 
persons or in the public interest.42 
 
 
2.3.2. Inspiration from International Law 
The constitutionalisation of justiciable ESR was controversial. Those opposed to the inclusion 
of ESR argued that empowering courts to enforce them would breach the separation of 
powers and would interfere with the budgetary and policy competences of the legislative 
branch.43 Furthermore, they considered that ESR were difficult to adjudicate due to the 
perception that they were of an exclusively ‘positive nature’, and ‘unclearly defined’.44 The 
discussions largely mirrored the international debates on the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights. However, concerns of overly powerful courts or an infringement of the separation of 
powers eventually gave way to a thicker conception of the rule of law based on the values 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.45 
Civil society and supporters of a comprehensive Bill of Rights relied heavily on the 
ICESCR to campaign for the inclusion of ESR.46 According to Liebenberg, three arguments 
proved particularly persuasive.47 First, the Bill of Rights – the reflection of the highest 
normative commitments of the nation – should explicitly outline provisions for redressing the 
systemic socio-economic deprivation experienced by the black population under colonial and 
apartheid rule.48 Second, without access to basic services and resources, it would be difficult 
to enjoy many of the civil and political rights.49 Third, socio-economic rights were regarded 
as integral to the creation of a more equitable society. In the First Certification judgment, the 
Constitutional Court dismissed arguments that it was infringing on the legislature’s powers 
                                                 
42 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 s 38 (n 5). 
43 See D Davis, 'The Case against the Inclusion of Socio-Economic Demands in a Bill of Rights except as 
Directive Principles' (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 475; A Sachs, 'Concluding Comments on 
the Panel Discussion' 8 ESR Review 17 (describing opponents’ arguments). 
44 South African Law Commission, Group and Human Rights: Interim Report (Pretoria, The Law Commission, 
1991). 
45 See for instance: ANC Submission to the Theme Committee, 23 September 1995, and Lawyers for Human 
Rights Submission, 30 July 1995; both discussed in Heyns and Viljoen (n 20) 553. 
46 Heyns and Viljoen (n 20) 553. 
47 Liebenberg, 'Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under Bills of Rights: The South African 
Experience' (n 37). 
48 For the arguments of proponents: N Haysom, 'Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-
Economic Rights' 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 451; E Mureinik, 'Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: 
Economic Rights in the Constitution' 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 464; C Scott and P Macklem, 
'Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees Social Rights in a New South African Constitution' 141 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1. 
49 In Mandela’s words, ‘we do not want freedom without bread, nor do we want bread without freedom’. N 
Mandela, 'Address on the Occasion of the ANC’s Bill of Rights Conference' (A Bill of Rights for a Democratic 
South Africa: Papers and Report of a Conference Convened by the ANC Constitutional Committee, 1991), 12. 
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when it adjudicates socio-economic matters having budgetary implications.50 The Court held 
that it had the power to determine accountability of the government with respect to all rights 
included in the Bill of Rights and thus also the enforcement of ESR.51 The road was thus 
paved for constitutional litigation of ESR provisions which are, according to the 
Constitutional Court, ‘clearly modelled’52 on the most relevant international instrument in this 
respect – the ICESCR. 
 
 
 
 
3. EVALUATING THE EMPOWERMENT OF COURTS TO ADDRESS ESR 
 
 
The Constitutional Court has developed extensive jurisprudence on socio-economic rights and 
in so doing has relied upon international norms. This section outlines the Court’s approach to 
some of the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 
 
 
3.1. If and How International Norms Have Been Used 
 
References to international ESR norms serve as potential indicators of the extent to which 
these norms are entrenched at the domestic level. Another possible indicator is the emphasis 
given to ESR by the highest instance court; in other words, whether it uses its constitutional 
powers to review ESR related cases.  
 
The first case on ESR following the certification of the 1996 Constitution involved an 
application for an order directing a hospital to provide the appellant with ongoing renal 
dialysis. The Court held that, given the limited resources and the patient’s poor health 
condition, the denial of the treatment, even if life-sustaining, did not breach constitutional 
rights.53 While it was factually a difficult first case, the Court was able to confirm its role as 
an adjudicator of socio-economic rights claims. In several subsequent cases, the Court has 
                                                 
50 In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) (10) BCLR 1253 (CC). 
51 ibid para 76-78. 
52 Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council 2002 (6) BCLR 625 (Witwatersrand 
Local Division) para 15. 
53 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). 
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refused the government’s arguments that resource constraints were the sole reason for a lack 
of progress in the realm of ESR, holding that the government failed to demonstrate that every 
reasonable effort had been made to use all resources at its disposition. Cases such as 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,54 Minister of Health v Treatment 
Action Campaign,55 Khosa v Minister of Social Development,56 Port Elizabeth Municipality v. 
Various Occupiers57 or the more recent cases Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of 
Johannesburg,58 Joe Slovo Community v. Thubelisha Homes & Others,59 and Mazibuko v City 
of Johannesburg,60 all underscore the reality of the judicial enforcement of ESR. Cases on 
purely negative duties, which are not subject to the qualifications of progressive realisation 
and resource constraints, have also been successfully litigated by claimants.61 In the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) case, the Court requested the government to provide anti-
retroviral drugs to reduce the rate of HIV transmission from mothers to children. The TAC 
case stands for the unequivocal dismissal of the government’s argument that courts are not 
empowered to grant remedies other than declarations in complex ERS cases.62  
 In these landmark decisions on rights mostly qualified by progressive realisation and 
resource constraints,63 the Court has adopted a standard of ‘reasonableness’.64 A particularly 
interesting decision is President v Modderklip, in which the Constitutional Court expressly 
linked the implementation of constitutional ESR with the rule of law. The Court found that 
the state’s failure to avoid the eviction of a community with no alternative housing secured 
was a violation of section 1(c) of the Constitution which states that South Africa is a 
                                                 
54 Government of the Republic of South Africa et al v Grootboom et al 2001 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
55 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 2002(5) SA 721 (CC). 
56 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social 
Development (2004) (6) BCLR 569 (CC).  
57 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
58 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and 
Others 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC). 
59 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes & Others, CCT 22/08 [2009] ZACC 
16. 
60 Lindiwe Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others, Case CCT 39/09, 2009 ZACC 28. 
61 The case of Jaftha v Schoeman and Others, Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) involved 
a successful challenge to an Act that permitted the sale in execution of people’s homes in order to satisfy debts 
without judicial oversight. 
62 Pieterse (n 7) 894 and TAC (n 55) para 38. 
63 Not all economic and social rights are qualified by progressive realisation. Exceptions are for instance 
children’s ESR, the right not to be refused emergency treatment, or the right not to be evicted without a court 
order. 
64 The Soobramoney Court started to establish criteria for assessing reasonableness, and these criteria have since 
been elaborated. A government program must be comprehensive, coherent, coordinated; appropriate financial 
and human resources must be made available; it must be balanced and flexible and make appropriate provision 
for short, medium and long-term needs; it must be reasonably conceived and implemented; it must be 
transparent, and its contents must be made known to the public. In Grootboom, the Court mentioned that those 
whose needs are most urgent must not be ignored by the measures. 
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democratic state founded on the ‘supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law’.65 In the 
view of the Court, the rule of law therefore requires substantive steps taken by the state to 
actively protect ESR. By holding that the failure to avoid the homelessness of the community 
amounted to an infringement of the rule of law, the Court  thus indicated that the 
constitutional framework favours a ‘thick’ account of the rule of law characterised by the 
commitment to the values enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 
 
The new constitutional era has led to the inclusion of international law principles in the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court. The practice of construing the term ‘international law’ 
broadly to include soft-law instruments was reaffirmed in a 2009 decision on the right to 
housing. In Joe Slovo Community v. Thubelisha Homes, the Court affirmed an eviction order 
but referred to General Comment No 7 of the UN Committee supervising the implementation 
of the ICESCR to make the point that evictions should not result in people being rendered 
homeless.66 According to de Wet, the Court however lacks a uniform and consistent strategy 
in considering non-applicable human rights instruments and soft law; it is often reluctant to 
consider international law norms other than those contained in human rights instruments.67 
Other commentators have noted that the Justices sometimes have failed to carefully ascertain 
the existence of an international rule before concluding whether its interpretations were 
consistent with international law.68 
 
 
3.2. Similarities and Differences Between the South African ESR Jurisprudence and 
International Normative Developments  
 
Three aspects of the South African jurisprudence reveal similarities and differences in the 
ways ESR have been interpreted by the South African Constitutional Court and at the 
international level. As the sub-sections below describe, first, there are examples of the Court 
in the past overlooking the applicability of relevant ESR provisions. Second, the Court has 
refused to apply the controversial minimum core concept developed by the UN Committee. 
                                                 
65 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (2005) (8) BCLR 786 
(CC) para 47. 
66 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (2009) (9) BCLR 847 
(CC), para 232.  The Court insisted on meaningful engagement between public authorities and the persons to be 
evicted. 
67 E de Wet, 'The "Friendly but Cautious" Reception of International Law in the Jurisprudence of the South 
African Constitutional Court: Some Critical Remarks' (2005) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1529. 
68 See e.g. Dugard, 'International Law and the South African Constitution' (n 17) 90; discussing the use of 
amnesties in Azanian Peoples Organisation and Others v. President of the Republic, 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC).  
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Third, the interaction between international and domestic norms is two-directional and South 
African jurisprudence was incorporated into the newest international human rights law treaty, 
the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. 
 
 
3.2.1. Non-Application of Relevant ESR Provisions  
Commentators have raised concerns that the Constitutional Court has sometimes denied 
applicability of the provision on ESR most specifically dealing with the core of a claim.69 For 
instance, despite the clear language in section 28 of the Bill of Rights that children’s rights to 
basic food, shelter and health are not subject to progressive realisation,70 the Court’s openness 
to international law did not result in the prioritisation of economic and social rights 
obligations contained in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.71 Instead of applying 
section 28 that relates to children’s ESR, the Court held in Grootboom that section 26, subject 
to progressive realisation, was the only applicable right in that case.72 Despite the generally 
progressive approach by the Court of ESR interpretation, here, its interpretation appears more 
limited than the text of the Constitution would require it to be. 
 
 
3.2.2. Rejection of the Minimum Core Concept  
There is at least one area in which the South African jurisprudence differs from concepts 
developed at the international level. Although not uncontroversial at the international level,73 
the UN Committee has developed a ‘minimum core standard’ of socio-economic rights as a 
means of delineating the most basic state obligations under the ICESCR. These minimum 
levels of rights are, according to the Committee, not subjected to progressive realisation.74 
The South African Constitutional Court did not adopt this concept. Claimants in the 
Grootboom case were about to be evicted from slums with no alternative housing solution. 
The Constitutional Court ruled that the individuals could not be evicted until an acceptable 
                                                 
69 See C Scott, 'Reaching Beyond (without Abandoning) the Category of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' 
(1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 633, 639. 
70 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 s 28(1)c providing that ‘every child has the 
right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services’. 
71 South Africa ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1995. 
72 Grootboom (n 54) para 71. Discussed in Pieterse (n 7) 900 and C Scott and P Alston, 'Adjudicating 
Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s 
Promise' 16 South African Journal on Human Rights. 
73 K Young, 'The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content' (2008) 33 
Yale Journal of International Law 113. 
74 The concept first appears in UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 'General Comment No 3 
on the nature of States parties obligations’ (14 December 1992) UN Doc E/1991/23 para 10. 
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housing alternative had been provided for them, but it explicitly rejected the existence of a 
minimum core obligation underlying sections 26 and 27.75 The Court confirmed this stance in 
the Mazibuko case, in which poor residents in Soweto challenged the authorities’ plan for a 
new water policy to curb water losses, leaking pipes and unpaid bills. The question of whether 
the Court should adopt a minimum core approach (in this case, the number of litres of free 
water per person) was at the centre of the decision. The unanimous Court underscored that 
while international law, including soft-law, was relevant and helpful for the resolution of 
constitutional disputes, it would not adopt the minimum core approach as posited by the UN 
Committee.76 Rather, as already held in Grootboom and TAC, the Court repeated that the 
appropriate test for assessing whether ESR are ‘progressively realised within available 
resources’ was one of ‘reasonableness’. This standard of review has been criticised as being 
deferential and failing to engage with the substance of the rights in question. However, 
recourse to the principle of reasonableness allowed the Court to find a policy unreasonable 
without having to prescribe to the other branches of government what they must do in order to 
act reasonably.77 Pieterse has sceptically appraised that standard, comparing it to the standard 
of reasonableness in administrative law,78 a principle of common law that also applied during 
apartheid.79According to Pieterse, ‘By retreating to the comfort zone of administrative law, 
the Grootboom Court has made an important conceptual gain – it has mapped out a (what it 
considers appropriate) role for the judiciary in adjudicating the often polycentric issues raised 
by social rights claims. In doing so, Grootboom illustrates that vindicating social rights is not 
as far removed from courts’ “ordinary” review function as is often contended.’80 
 
There are, however, three reasons why the rejection of the minimum core test in the South 
African jurisprudence should not be overemphasised. First, reasonableness is a standard found 
in the South African Constitution and as such, it is natural that the Court invokes it over the 
unsettled concepts developed by the UN Committee. Second, the idea of a minimum core is 
actually similar to the South African reasonableness test. Fredman for instance has 
convincingly likened the minimum core with a right to action from the state and right to 
                                                 
75 Grootboom (n 54) para 30-33. For an analysis of the implications of the refusal to acknowledge the existence 
of minimum core obligations, see Pieterse (n 7) 898. 
76 Mazibuko (n 60) para 52-61. 
77 Brand (n 39) 227 and Liebenberg, 'Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under Bills of Rights: The 
South African Experience' (n 37) 5. 
78 Pieterse (n 7) 893. 
79 J Meierhenrich, The Legacies of Law: Long-Run Consequences of Legal Development in South Africa, 1652-
2000 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 287. 
80 Pieterse (n 7) 893. See also CR Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (Oxford University 
Press, New York 2001) 234. 
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require the state to take immediate steps according to a plan that has to be designed taking 
equality and public participation into account.81 This understanding of the minimum core 
concept, as opposed to an approach interested in a predetermined baseline of a bundle of 
goods, indeed closely resembles the South African reasonableness test. Third, regardless of 
whether the Court refers to a minimum core or a test of reasonableness, the more important 
question is whether deference has gone too far so that the test employed no longer provides 
for practical meaning of constitutional rights. The recent Mazibuko decision indeed illustrates 
the implications of turning the reasonableness standard into a very deferential test. As 
Fredman explains, while the Court considered it appropriate to demand justification for 
government policies,82 it was overly forthcoming in accepting the justification advanced by 
the authorities.83 While the Mazibuko case was litigated in South African courts, the 
conceptual approach of reasonableness review turned out to be the one which resolved the last 
remaining issue in the negotiation of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, as the next section 
illustrates. 
 
 
3.2.3. South African Jurisprudence Influences the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR 
The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR is the procedural instrument that will, once entered into 
force, allow the supervisory body to receive individual communications on rights contained in 
the ICESCR.84 The appropriate standard of review of communications was resolved only in 
the last moments of the drafting. The Gordian knot was cut with language borrowed from the 
jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court. Article 8(4) of the OP directs the 
Committee ‘to consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance 
with part II of the Covenant.’85 Porter appropriately summarises that ‘just as the South 
African Constitutional Court has incorporated jurisprudence from the ICESCR into its own 
domestic jurisprudence, so has South African jurisprudence now informed the text of an 
international human rights instrument.’86 Thus, although South Africa is still not a state party 
                                                 
81 S Fredman, 'Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitutional Court: Is the Honeymoon Over?' 
(Oxford Transitional Justice Research 8 March 2010) 
media.podcasts.ox.ac.uk/socleg/otjr_seminars/michalowski-fredman-medium-audio.mp3. 
82 ibid.  
83 For instance, the Court accepted a legalistic interpretation that residents who cannot afford additional water 
credit do not suffer ‘discontinuation’ of water unlawful under the Water Services Act, but merely a ‘suspension 
in water services’. Mazibuko (n 60) para 115. 
84 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 10 
December 2008) UN GA Res A/Res/63/117 (OP to the ICESCR). 
85 OP to the ICESCR, art 8(4). 
86 B Porter, 'The Reasonableness of Article 8(4) - Adjudicating Claims from the Margins' (2009) 27 Nordisk 
Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter 39, 50. 
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to the Covenant,87 it has influenced the relevant normative reference to assess a state’s 
compliance with the obligations contained in the ICESCR. 
 
So far, this chapter has discussed the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court 
in light of the references it has made to international norms on ESR, affirming international 
principles pertaining to socio-economic rights on multiple occasions. It has dismissed 
arguments denying its institutional competence to deal with ESR and it has shown a notable 
openness to a variety of international legal sources. At the same time, discomforting signs of a 
potentially deferential use of the reasonableness review and a rejection of the applicability of 
some ESR provisions indicate that the Court’s comfort zone has its limits. Measured against 
the legal situation prevailing two decades ago, the country has shown remarkable capacity to 
transform its legal system and the place it accords to international law and human rights law 
in particular. But to what extent has the entrenchment of ESR norms led to concrete 
improvements in the realisation of human rights? An assessment of purely formal aspects, 
such as whether the Court cites international human rights treaties or General Comments does 
not answer the question whether progress has been made towards realising the ends of human 
rights law and, by extension, of the rule of law. 
 
 
3.3. Whether Entrenching International ESR Norms Has Led to Concrete Improvements  
 
Kleinfeld is justifiably critical of the fact that the current rule of law literature is overly 
focused on institutions and formal legal outcomes, rather than on what she calls ‘the ends of 
rule of law’.88 Ends of the rule of law include substantive criteria, such as concrete protection 
of human rights and equality.89 To evaluate success in realising such ends, the analysis must 
go beyond an assessment of the interactions between international legal norms of ESR and the 
case law of courts. The preamble of the 1996 Constitution describes unabashedly ambitious 
ends-based criteria: that the entrenchment of ESR in the Bill of Rights would lead to ‘a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’.90 
 For a former Chief Justice of the South African Constitutional Court, ‘what counts is 
the effect on the ground. Judicial protection of human rights must ultimately translate into a 
                                                 
87 See Heyns and Viljoen (n 20) 546 and n 29. 
88 R Kleinfeld, 'Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law' in T Carothers (ed), Promoting the Rule of Law 
Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006) 34. 
89 ibid 35. 
90 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 preamble. 
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utility that is real and accessible to those that need it the most.’91 Despite the international 
praise of Grootboom and other decisions, the actual impact of that judgment on the housing 
situation of the litigants and those who find themselves in a similar situation has been very 
limited.92 In 2008, Irene Grootboom, the main litigant in the 2001 landmark case died 
homeless.93 A study completed a few months prior to her death found that the decision of the 
Court did not translate into effective implementation essentially because of a ‘failure to plan 
proactively, lack of co-operative governance and inadequate controls over financial and 
human resources’ at the level of local government.94 From a constitutional law perspective, 
the Grootboom judgment propelled the jurisprudence on ESR and even influenced the 
wording of a new international treaty. But the picture is rather bleak if one measures the 
success according to ends-based criteria about the concrete realisation of the economic and 
social rights of the litigants and others similarly placed. 
 
Apart from sometimes weakly implemented decisions, the wider effects of the 
constitutionalisation of ESR have also fallen short of achieving the ambitious transformative 
goals expressed in the Constitutuion’s preamble which envisages ‘a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’.95 In the decade after the 
adoption of the new Constitution, the country has improved in the protection of civil and 
political rights,96 but despite significant economic growth, South Africa remains a country 
where large parts of society de facto continue to be denied access to work, health, or 
education.97 Paradoxically, fifteen years after this remarkable negotiated transition, socio-
economic inequalities have increased in South Africa.98 
 The effects of constitutionalising ESR norms have been modest both on a formal and a 
practical level. Further complicating the picture are a number of factors specific to South 
Africa. These contextual factors cast doubt on the independent value of textual 
                                                 
91 P Langa, 'Taking Dignity Seriously - Judicial Reflections on the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR' (2009) 27 
Nordisk Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter 29, 31. 
92 K Pillay, 'Implementing Grootboom - Supervision Needed' (2002) 3 ESR Review: Economic and Social 
Rights in South Africa 1,3. 
93 P Joubert, 'Grootboom Dies Homeless and Penniless' Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg 8 August 2008) 
www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-08-grootboom-dies-homeless-and-penniless. 
94 H Kruuse, 'Life in the Suburbs After ‘Grootboom’: The Role of Local Government in Realising Housing 
Rights in the Eastern Cape' (LLM thesis, Rhodes University 2008). 
95 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 preamble (n 5). 
96 Two available measurements are Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009: South Africa (Washington 
D.C., Freedom House, 2009). M Gibney, L Cornett, R Wood, Political Terror Scale 1976-2008, 
www.politicalterrorscale.org. 
97 M Leibbrandt et al, Trends in South African Income Distribution and Poverty since the Fall of Apartheid 
(OECD, Paris 2010) 67. 
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transformations of a constitution. Some of the assumptions behind transformative 
constitutionalism as a rule of law strategy may thus have to be rethought. Yet, we do not have 
to end on an entirely pessimistic note. 
 
 
 
 
4. IDENTIFYING LESSONS FROM A GLASS HALF EMPTY 
 
 
The legal literature discusses a number of factors which may have made South Africa a 
unique case and which may explain the relative success of its formal transition. As discussed 
below, these factors include special characteristics of the process and actors through which 
the 1996 Constitution came into being, as well as a shared belief among the stakeholders in 
the relevance of law.99 
 
 
4.1. Process and Actors  
 
One unique factor of South Africa’s transition is that most, if not all, of the protagonists 
negotiating the new constitutional framework were domestic actors. While there was 
international pressure to end apartheid,100 and a number of foreign academics played a role in 
informing the debate,101 the actual negotiation process was domestically driven: domestic 
civil society lobbied for the new Bill of Rights in general and for the inclusion of ESR in 
particular102 and law clinics at non-white universities drew attention to abuses during the 
apartheid era.103 While international pressure and the years of naming and shaming likely 
influenced the constitutional negotiations, it was the government itself that, to the surprise of 
                                                 
99 Other unique aspects not discussed here were the ability of the leadership to overcome inter-group enmity, 
other elements which helped to legitimise the State (such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission), 
economic interdependency, and the country’s ability to move from an initial period of formal, guaranteed power 
sharing (consociationalism) to a more integrative approach of power-sharing. 
100 D Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa (Brookings Institution Press, D.C. 1997). 
101 Aucoin recommends that outside actors should confine their role in constitution-making to form the debate 
and to create a participatory process. L Aucoin, 'The Role of International Experts in Constitution-Making-Myth 
and Reality' (2004) 5 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 89, 90. 
102 For an overview of civil society in South Africa, see J Stremlau and H Zille, A House No Longer Divided: 
Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa (Washington D.C., Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict 1997).  
103 J Stromseth, R Brooks and D Wippman, (n 3) 334. 
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most jurists, changed its attitude to the Bill of Rights and abandoned its original opposition to 
human rights.104 Domestic ownership of such a process heavily influences the degree of 
legitimacy afforded to the new constitution.105 Equally important is the degree of public 
involvement in the process of constitution-making. Posters, pop songs, television debates and 
cartoons explained the process and urged people to share their thoughts on the new 
constitutional order. This unparalleled degree of public involvement meant that 1.9 million 
people offered their ideas on the new Constitution.106  
 
The constitutional process in South Africa differed from recent experiences in other 
transitional countries. Despite the rhetoric of ‘local ownership’, international actors and 
foreign states often impose impetus, resources and timetables. Since its transition was 
domestically driven, South Africa had no external time restrictions in its constitutional 
process, engaging in a five to seven-year transformation project.107 Conversely, Kosovo’s 
recent constitutional process took hardly more than a year,108 and Iraq is a textbook example 
of a rushed process driven by international timetables.109 It is likely that the domestic 
ownership over the process and its timing helps explain the largely positive attitude of South 
Africans towards this document.110 Commentaries also suggest that a separation of the 
process into different phases, namely the record of understanding in 1992 and the 1993 
Interim Constitution, helped to facilitate transparency and credibility over time.111  
 
 
4.2. Legal Tradition and a Shared Belief in the Relevance of Law 
 
Meinerheinrich has examined another significant distinctiveness of the South African 
example: the shared belief in the centrality of law. His main argument is that in South Africa, 
law assisted the negotiators in the framing of complex problems and contributed to the 
enforcement of credible commitments. While he insists that his analysis is in no way 
apologetic about apartheid, he points out that even the illiberal legal norms and institutions of 
                                                 
104 International Commission of Jurists and Bindman (n 7) 142. 
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the apartheid era had an important structuring effect on democratic outcomes.112 
Meinerheinrich argues that path-dependent confidence in the utility of law in the transition 
from authoritarian rule created the conditions for the emergence of trust between democracy-
demanding and democracy-resisting elites.113 Mandela and De Klerk – lawyers themselves – 
both acknowledged the legacy of South Africa’s legal tradition. The perceived capacity of the 
legal order to positively matter for the purposes of social change is eloquently described by 
former Justice Albie Sachs:  
 
In the case of South Africa, the rules that govern purchase and sale and insurance and companies 
and cheques, that deal with self-defence and dishonesty and with when people should be held 
responsible for injuries to others, happened to have come from Europe. Like the railways and 
trousers and dresses and Bibles and the English language, they came in the context of 
dispossession and domination, but like the railways and trousers and dresses and the Bible and the 
English language, they [...] have now become South Africanised. [...] Shorn of their associations 
with domination, there is no reason why these institutions should not be taken over and infused 
with a new spirit so as to serve the people as a whole rather than just a minority.114 
 
In South Africa, there was a shared conception that law matters. Unfortunately, there is no 
reason to assume that such a belief is ubiquitous in other states emerging from a repressive 
regime or from an armed conflict. Courts cannot invent such belief in the relevance of law. As 
Stromseth explains, ‘when people believe law matters, it will matter; when people think law 
does not matter, it rarely can, and few rule of law programs pay explicit attention to the 
conundrum of how to go from the latter stage to the former’.115 With regard to ESR in South 
Africa, the formal status of the ICCPR was not of decisive importance for its relevance in the 
domestic jurisprudence.116 Rather, the ICCPR was relevant due to the attitude of the judiciary 
and their opinion about the division of power between the legislature and the judiciary.117 
 The recommendation that follows is that the South African experience should not be 
considered as a model that can be readily replicated in other situations. The belief in the 
relevance of international human rights norms and the perceived jurisdictional authority of the 
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South African courts appear to have been a precondition for the entrenchment of ESR in the 
domestic legal system – and even under those fertile conditions, the practical success so far 
has been relative. Considering that these contextual factors present in South Africa differ 
radically from many other transitioning states, should we therefore be pessimistic about the 
effects of entrenching international norms in the domestic legal system? The concluding 
section offers broader considerations on the benefits that the South African experience with 
ESR may offer to assist the merits and pitfalls of constitutional engineering.  
 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
 
This chapter has dealt with South Africa’s efforts to entrench a thicker conception of the rule 
of law by constitutionalising ESR rights within the domestic Bill of Rights. Severe poverty, 
inequality and discrimination were key features and consequences of the apartheid. Rather 
than ‘merely’ clarifying the role of different branches of government and restraining the 
state’s power from interfering with citizens’ lives, the South African Bill of Rights was 
envisioned as assisting in the creation of a more equal society based on respect for human 
rights. By delineating the inclusion of ESR and therefore the new emphasis placed upon 
international law in the domestic legal system, this chapter has provided a mixed picture of 
the success of the transformative constitutionalist ambitions. While the judicial system has 
demonstrated a significant increase in the adoption of international legal principles, the 
practical impact of the Constitutional Court’s decisions on socio-economic rights are 
insufficient in themselves to establish a society based on social justice and fundamental 
human rights. The effects of constitutionalism can only be considered as one, albeit crucial, 
aspect of a much larger societal project. This chapter therefore cautions that rule of law 
programming that tries to entrench ESR in a domestic legal system should consider the South 
African experience as a reminder of the complexities involved in a such project, rather than an 
example of a fast-track solution to redress past and present inequalities. 
 Arthurs exposes assumptions underlying contemporary models of transformative 
consititutionalism that are based on a belief in constitutional adjudication as a way of 
transforming economies and polities, societies and cultures. He points out that ‘written texts, 
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entrenched rights and constitutional litigation do not and cannot actually contribute much to 
fundamental social and political transformations’.118 Examining India, South Africa and 
Germany as countries that adopted a new constitutional regime in the aftermath of conflict, 
colonialism and authoritarianism, Arthurs observes that in all three cases the judiciary ‘often, 
if not always, applied [human, political and social rights] energetically and imaginatively’.119 
Ultimately however, as suggested in this chapter, the most relevant question is one which 
inquires as to the actual contribution of this new constitution to social, political or economic 
transformation. In Arthurs’ view, ‘constitutional litigation has only a marginal effect on 
public policy, practical governance and the allocation of public goods’.120 
 
There are nevertheless good reasons to be somewhat more optimistic. By affirming human 
rights, courts legitimate their practice and advocacy, which in turn contributes to the wider 
legitimisation of claims based on socio-economic rights language.121 It seems that in South 
Africa, the best outcomes were achieved where constitutional litigation was not an alternative 
strategy to social mobilisation, but rather an essential element of a wider campaign.122 In other 
words, where civil society was able to combine the court-based litigation strategy rights with 
a broader mobilisation, as in the TAC case, the new Bill of Rights had good prospects of 
contributing to practical changes. The TAC judgment probably saved thousands of lives by 
ordering that the government act ‘without delay’ to provide antiretroviral drugs and that it 
undertake reasonable measures to provide testing and counselling facilities.123 Moreover, 
unlike the Grootboom decision, TAC was much better implemented in practice.124 The 
Mazibuko water case was another example of a case which was pursued in tandem with social 
mobilisation efforts. Even if the Court ultimately rejected the applicants’ arguments, it 
emphasised that the constitutional obligation to ensure progressive realisation of ESR entails 
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that any policies must be continually monitored.125 It has been argued that at least some 
engagement by the authorities was spurred by the litigation in the case itself.126 Hence, even 
unsuccessful cases can sometimes lead to changes in policies during the process of litigation, 
while successful but unimplemented cases like Grootboom can lay the foundation for 
effective future decisions.127 Wickeri explains that ‘despite the absence of sweeping change 
for South Africans living in informal settlements, Grootboom provided a powerful tool for 
communities involved in evictions proceedings, building a growing body of right-to-housing 
case-law based on discrete victories for various communities.’128  
 
Many countries emerging from conflict or oppressive rule face daunting challenges as a result 
of denials of socio-economic rights for large parts of their populations. Even if several crucial 
aspects made South Africa’s transition unique, its constitutional moment enables us to think 
anew of the complexities facing actors promoting the rule of law. The drafters of the 1996 
Constitution acknowledged that a substantive or ‘thick’ understanding of the rule of law must 
be established if the structural injustices were to be addressed. They hoped that the 
constitutionalisation of socio-economic rights would contribute to the country’s social 
transformation. Fifteen years later, it can be said that entrusting courts to enforce ESR norms 
was a partial, but modest success in South Africa and results were strongest where court-
based strategies were complemented as part of broader campaigns. In short, the constitutional 
entrenchment of ESR did have positive effects, but we should not expect that 
constitutionalism, in isolation, will necessarily lead to ground-breaking social transformations 
in every situation. 
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